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STEALTH ADVOCACY CAN (SOMETIMES)
CHANGE THE WORLD
Margo Schlanger*
Below the Radar: How Silence Can Save Civil Rights. By Ali-
son L. Gash. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2015.
Pp. xx, 205. $45.
Introduction
Scholarship and popular writing about lawsuits seeking broad social
change have been nearly as contentious as the litigation itself. In a normative
mode, commentators on the right have long attacked change litigation as
imperialist and ill informed,1 besides producing bad outcomes.2 Attacks
from the left have likewise had both prescriptive and positive strands, argu-
ing that civil rights litigation is “subordinating, legitimating, and alienat-
ing.”3 As one author recently summarized in this Law Review, these
observers claim “that rights litigation is a waste of time, both because it is
not actually successful in achieving social change and because it detracts
attention and resources from more meaningful and sustainable forms of
work such as mobilization, political lobbying, and community organizing.”4
Several particularly influential studies eschew the clear ideological posi-
tion of the works just referenced; they offer what they claim is a purer em-
pirical grounding for the conversation. These studies highlight backlash,
purporting to demonstrate that many landmark decisions—among them,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, the
Hawaii Supreme Court’s Baehr v. Lewin, and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court’s Goodridge v. Department of Public Health—have turned out
to be not merely inefficacious but counterproductive, harming the very
causes they aimed to assist because of the countermovements they
provoked.5
* Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (1977); Nathan
Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, Pub. Int., Fall 1975, at 104.
2. See, e.g., Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Pub-
lic Policy (1989); Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What
Happens When Courts Run Government (2003).
3. Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 713, 715 (2011).
4. Alan K. Chen, Rights Lawyer Essentialism and the Next Generation of Rights Critics,
111 Mich. L. Rev. 903, 922 (2013) (book review).
5. On Brown and Roe, the most well-known proponents of this backlash analysis are
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
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But rights lawsuits have their defenders as well, among both advocates
and scholars.6 Many of these defenders agree with lawsuit critics that “activ-
ists and analysts” err, badly, if they assume “that litigation can evoke a decla-
ration of rights from courts; that it can, further, be used to assure the
realization of these rights; and, finally, that realization is tantamount to
meaningful change.”7 To use Professor Scheingold’s phrase, these assump-
tions are tantamount to a “myth of rights”8—and, like so many myths, this
one does not reflect reality. A much more fruitful frame, Scheingold writes
in his classic treatment, focuses on “the politics of rights,”9 in which a right
recognized by a court is “best treated as a resource of uncertain worth”
whose “value . . . will . . . depend in all likelihood on the circumstances and
on the manner in which it is employed.”10 Accordingly, rights lawsuits—and
the “cause lawyers” who bring them—can improve the welfare of their in-
tended beneficiaries, by using litigation as a piece of a more comprehensive
political strategy.
Continuing to quote Scheingold (but it could be any of a small library
of consonant analyses), litigation and the rights it aims to vindicate are pro-
ductive only if “useful for redistributing power and influence in the political
arena.”11 This can occur if litigation is used for “political mobilization
and . . . in this way affect[s] the balance of forces.”12 Introducing data from
her interviews with dozens of leading public interest lawyers, Professor
Rhode explains:
(1st ed. 1991), and Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights (2004). More
recently, both Rosenberg and Klarman also addressed backlash to marriage-equality cases, in-
cluding in Hawaii and Massachusetts. Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Al-
tar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (2013) [hereinafter
Klarman, Closet to the Altar]; Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts
Bring About Social Change? 419 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Rosenberg, The Hollow
Hope (2d ed.)]; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong
Places, 54 Drake L. Rev. 795, 812–13 (2006). Klarman’s 2013 book is far less categorical in its
claim of counterproductiveness than his 2005 article on the same topic, Michael J. Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 Mich. L. Rev. 431, 482 (2005) (“By outpacing
public opinion on issues of social reform, such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut moder-
ates, and retard the cause they purport to advance.”).
6. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen & Scott L. Cummings, Public Interest Lawyering: A
Contemporary Perspective 220–21, 521–22 (2013); Joel F. Handler, Social Movements
and the Legal System: A Theory of Law Reform and Social Change 214–22 (1978);
Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering (1992); Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work:
Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (1994); Deborah L. Rhode,
Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 2027 (2008).
7. Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and
Political Change 5 (Univ. of Mich. Press, 2d ed. 2004) (1974).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis omitted).
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id.
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Part of the reason public interest groups have relied heavily on lawsuits is
because they can sometimes mobilize such [financial and popular] support
and because other options are less available. . . . As research on social
movements makes clear, lawsuits can help frame problems as injustices,
identify perpetrators and responses, and reinforce a sense of collective
identity, all of which build a political base for reform.13
Rhode further summarizes: “In describing their most effective strategies,
public interest leaders most often mentioned, in addition to impact litiga-
tion, coalition building and communication.”14 And indeed, studies of the
varied practices of advocates for whom litigation is an important tool find
that litigation remains attractive to those advocates in large part because
lawsuits provide a public focal point for organizing, possessing a “unique
ability . . . to attract resources and publicity.”15
In Below the Radar: How Silence Can Save Civil Rights, Alison L. Gash16
adds a key insight into the mix—and in the process demonstrates that litiga-
tion theory needs substantially more sophistication to catch up with smart
lawyers. Sometimes, she argues, civil rights advocates and clients succeed not
by using litigation to organize or mobilize movements, but by stealth—by
keeping their cases quiet, “below the radar” of public notice and therefore of
opposition. Gash develops two case studies to undergird the theoretical
point. The first deals with parenting-equality advocacy on behalf of gays and
lesbians, the second with group homes for people with disabilities or recov-
ering from addictions. Each is interesting on its own, and each is well told.
Gash doesn’t just summarize existing evidence; she interviewed dozens of
advocates, and these form the core of her account. In addition, Gash con-
ducted several very illuminating media-analysis studies.
Part I of this Review addresses the parenting-equality case study. I sum-
marize Gash’s account and add to it the cautionary tale of the 2002 failure of
stealth parenting-equality advocacy in Michigan. Part II addresses, more
briefly, Gash’s group-home study. In Part III, I put Gash’s theoretical contri-
bution into context. Her important and original contribution is her claim
13. Rhode, supra note 6, at 2044 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 2048.
15. Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT
Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1667, 1687 (2014). Professor Leachman rests this
summary—which she demonstrates applies to LGBT advocacy in California over three de-
cades—on a large array of prior work, including, for example, McCann, supra note 6, at
54–60; Helena Silverstein, Unleashing Rights: Law, Meaning, and the Animal Rights
Movement 71 (1996); Steven E. Barkan, Political Trials and Resource Mobilization: Towards an
Understanding of Social Movement Litigation, 58 Soc. Forces 944, 954–55 (1980); Christopher
Coleman et al., Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus
Protest, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 663, 668 (2005) (asserting that social movements used the law
“as a rhetorical resource, as a ‘club,’ . . . an inspiration and an aspiration—to gain the upper
hand in the conflict”); and Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: Reassessing the Influence of
Legal Advocacy Organizations in Social Movements, in Cause Lawyers and Social Move-
ments 145, 145–46, 158 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
16. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon.
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that civil rights litigation can succeed quietly, not just loudly. In evaluating
this claim, I suggest that she might usefully have addressed the issue of
whether stealth advocacy is really a subset of a broader category of efforts to
first alter social facts on the ground, and then play defense to preserve that
alteration.
I. The Fight for Parenting Equality
Gash compares parenting-equality litigation to a more familiar strug-
gle—for LGBT marriage equality. The basic contours of the same-sex mar-
riage saga are familiar to anyone who has been paying attention for the past
twenty years. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of gay and lesbian couples
attempted to get married, but failed. Even the few who succeeded in ob-
taining marriage licenses from cooperative county clerks were unable to ex-
ercise the ordinary rights concomitant with marriage. For example, Gash
recounts the episode underlying an early litigation loss in which an Ameri-
can’s visa application for his husband was denied—notwithstanding their
Colorado marriage license and ceremony—with a letter from a federal im-
migration official that stated, “You have failed to establish that a bona fide
marital relationship can exist between two faggots.”17 Scattered litigation ef-
forts were equally unavailing.18 But that changed in 1993, when the Hawaii
Supreme Court took a step toward marriage equality, holding in Baehr v.
Lewin that under the Hawaii Constitution, a ban on same-sex marriage
would pass muster only if the state could demonstrate “(a) the statute’s sex-
based classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the stat-
ute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the applicant
couples’ constitutional rights.”19 Along with a remand to the state trial
court, to determine if such a rationale existed, came a “tsunami of opposi-
tion” nationwide (p. 193).
Under the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause,20 marriages law-
fully celebrated in any state are presumptively valid in any other state, absent
17. P. 54 (internal quotation marks omitted). It seems that the letter, but not the ruling,
was rescinded. According to an Associated Press description of a more moderately expressed
superseding document, the Immigration and Nationalization Service later explained that
“while one partner in a homosexual marriage may function as a female in some ways, he
cannot function as a wife by assuming female duties and obligations inherent in the marital
relationship,” and that “[a] union of this sort was never intended by Congress to form a basis
of a visa petition.” Gay Pair Sue U.S. Immigration to Ward Off Man’s Deportation, Globe &
Mail, Mar. 16, 1979, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). This incident is also described
in Stephen H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, Immigration and Refugee Law and
Policy 267–73 (5th ed. 2009). The resulting litigation is reported as Adams v. Howerton, 673
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036; Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972);
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
19. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
20. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
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contrary congressional action.21 Hawaii allows nonresidents to marry; there’s
no need even to spend a few days at the beach waiting for a license.22 So had
Hawaii’s same-sex marriage ban failed on remand,23 any same-sex couple
could have traveled to Hawaii to marry and then demanded—and plausibly,
if not certainly, received—recognition of that marriage back home. Gash
quotes a pro-LGBT activist who explains that this possibility was extraordi-
narily threatening to same-sex marriage opponents: “There was this threat
that we didn’t encounter with other issues. It’s like a virus. If you let Hawaii
[sic] then all gays everywhere can marry. If you allow it anywhere you allow
it everywhere” (p. 62).
And so opponents responded. They passed the federal Defense of Mar-
riage Act (“DOMA”), which both defined “marriage,” for federal purposes,
as “mean[ing] only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife,” and authorized states to deny full faith and credit to same-
sex marriages recognized in other states.24 And in state after state, the oppo-
nents passed either statutes or constitutional amendments—or both—bar-
ring same-sex couples from getting married.25
Thus in the years following Baehr, same-sex marriage looked to many
observers like a clear object lesson about the limits of rights litigation. “Sim-
ply put,” gay rights scholar John D’Emilio wrote in 2007, “the marriage
campaign has been a disaster.”26 Rosenberg, for his part, scolded LGBT ad-
vocates for their overreach:
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
21. For a comprehensive analysis of the full faith and credit and choice-of-law issues
relevant to state recognition of “unpopular marriages,” see Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-
Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations
on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following
Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 551, 599–600 (1994).
22. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 572-1 to -15 (2006 & Supp. 2013), amended by Hawaii Marriage
Equality Act of 2013 (effective Dec. 2, 2013); see also Vital Records: Marriage Licenses, Haw. St.
Dep’t of Health, http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalrecords/marriage-licenses/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2014) (no waiting period).
23. What did happen on remand was the following: First, the court entered a long stay
for the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law to make a recommendation. Then the
Commission issued a recommendation in favor of marriage equality. Then the state passed a
constitutional amendment. Klarman, Closet to the Altar, supra note 5, at 57, 63–66.
24. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
25. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (2d ed.), supra note 5, at 357 tbl.13.1; History and
Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the United States, Freedom to Marry, http://www
.freedomtomarry.org/pages/history-and-timeline-of-marriage (last updated Oct. 6, 2014);
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx.
26. John D’Emilio, Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex
Marriage, in The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage 39, 45 (Craig A. Rimmerman & Clyde
Wilcox eds., 2007).
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Ultimately, the use of litigation to win the right to same-sex marriage
lends further support to the argument that courts are severely limited in
their capacity to further the interests of the relatively disadvantaged. . . .
[S]uccumbing to the “lure of litigation” appears to have been the wrong
move. . . . [A]fter 1996 it was clear that any further litigation victories
would produce continued backlash. . . . By litigating when they did, propo-
nents of same-sex marriage moved too far and too fast ahead of the curve,
leaping beyond what the American public could bear. The lesson here is a
simple one: those who rely on the courts absent significant public and po-
litical support will fail to achieve meaningful social change, and may set
their cause back.27
But Rosenberg was wrong; in fact, by the time he wrote that paragraph,
the tide had turned.
DOMA delivered a hard kick in the gut to LGBT equality. But it had one
useful side effect for marriage-equality advocates. Section 2 provided:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial pro-
ceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a rela-
tionship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.28
This language neutralized the cross-border impact of marriage equal-
ity—it meant that states were not required to recognize same-sex marriages
celebrated elsewhere. And that in turn meant that marriage-equality litiga-
tion could proceed state by state, appealing to each state’s decisionmakers to
think about their own state’s law or policy without worrying about spillover
effects. Opposition could likewise be cabined within each state, at least in
part.
Whether or not this counter to the prior expansionary force of marriage
recognition was a contributing cause, in 2003 the Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders (“GLAD”) won Goodridge v. Department of Public Health in
Massachusetts.29 The nation’s first authoritatively legal same-sex weddings
took place on May 17, 2004, creating an astounding array of feel-good
images of weddings and broadcasting a joyous, deeply nonthreatening vision
of same-sex marriage, as the PTA moms next door and the nice men down
the street populated wedding photos that were splashed across newspapers
and websites.30 Evan Wolfson, one of the nation’s leading marriage-equality
27. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (2d ed.), supra note 55, at 419.
28. Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
29. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
30. For a sliver of the galleries of wedding photos posted that day, see Mass. Marks First
Day of Legalized Same-Sex Marriage, Bos. Globe (May 18, 2004), http://www.bostonglobe
.com/metro/2004/05/17/mass-marks-first-day-legalized-same-sex-marriage/lG0ZI0A2SG54q9
Hww4lPDK/picture.html. My view that the Massachusetts weddings and the pictures they gen-
erated were part of the normalization of same-sex marriage, and therefore very much a force
for marriage equality, is not universally held. Klarman, for example, thinks the same events
elicited backlash:
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advocates, explained that what was so important about that day in Massa-
chusetts was “[g]etting people married, making it real. Real families, real
couples, really married.”31 The impact of May 17, Wolfson suggested, was
magnified because the legitimacy of those weddings was “unquestionable,
undistracted, pure.”32
What has triumphed over backlash in the marriage-equality campaign is
the changing public will.33 And among the pressures that induced that
change was the extraordinary public nature of the fight. By now, the tri-
umph of marriage equality seems inevitable.34 As of February 2015, same-
sex marriage is lawful in thirty-five states and the District of Columbia,
home states to 64 percent of Americans.35 In nine of those states, marriage
equality was achieved by legislation, in three by referendum, in five by state
court litigation, and in the remainder by federal litigation.36 In 2013, in
United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down DOMA’s ban on
federal recognition of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.37 In the two
years since, dozens of state and federal trial courts around the country have
Even at a time when polls showed a majority of Americans supporting civil unions, focus
groups still evidenced great discomfort with the idea of homosexuality and visceral revul-
sion toward an advertisement showing gays or lesbians kissing.
The weddings inspired by Goodridge elicited the same reaction as that advertise-
ment. Though these weddings were paid for by gay rights supporters, they did the work
of opponents.
Klarman, Closet to the Altar, supra note 5, at 175 (footnote omitted). There’s no question
that Election Day 2004 was a very bad day for marriage equality. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw,
Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain Widespread Support in 10 States, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/politics/campaign/03gay
.html. But even if the hard antiequality forces were galvanized by the events in Massachusetts,
so too were the proponents of equality, and the views of the previously ambivalent, skeptical
middle moved toward marriage equality. See, e.g., Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing
the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 Law & Soc’y Rev. 151, 159–75 (2009).
31. Daniel R. Pinello, America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 186 (2006)
(quoting an interview with Wolfson).
32. Id. Similar galleries of wedding photos from San Francisco, three months prior, were
also joyous, but I think less normalizing because Mayor Gavin Newsom’s decision to have his
city hall issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples was nonauthoritative, unlike the Good-
ridge decision. See id. at 73–90 (describing the San Francisco “Winter of Love”). Those mar-
riages were later declared invalid. Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
33. See Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%, Gallup
(May 21, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches-new-
high.aspx.
34. Except as otherwise cited, the information in this paragraph is tallied from the very
useful state-by-state guide posted at States, Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry
.org/states/ (last updated Jan. 19, 2015).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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found state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional—with only rare de-
cisions coming out the other way, so far.38 In the federal courts of appeals,
the score thus far is five to one in favor of marriage equality—the Sixth
Circuit stands alone.39 The Supreme Court denied review in a first round of
petitions for certiorari, but granted review of the Sixth Circuit’s cases in
January; arguments will likely occur in April.40 Even if the Court, against
current predictions, agrees with the Sixth Circuit, the next stage of the
march toward equality is aided by public opinion: 55 percent of the Ameri-
can public—and 78 percent of people from ages 18 to 29—support same-
sex marriage.41
The account just provided is, at this point, close to conventional wis-
dom. (I lay a bit more stress than some other observers on the positive im-
pact of the weddings in May 2004.) But Gash has a good deal to add.
First, she describes a parallel advocacy effort, to assist gay and lesbian
parents. This story is far less familiar than the high-visibility marriage cam-
paign. Gash’s account begins fifty years ago, when lesbian and gay parents
fought for custodial access to their own children that their divorcing spouses
sought to deny them (pp. 97–98). Cases prior to the 1960s were, she ex-
plains, “largely unsupportive of gay and lesbian parents.”42 Beginning in the
mid-1960s, however, “the tides against gay and lesbian parents seemed to (at
least marginally) shift” (p. 98). A key precedent, Gash explains (p. 98), was
Nadler v. Superior Court, in which a California trial court held that “[t]he
homosexuality of plaintiff as a matter of law constitutes her not a fit or
proper person to have the care, custody and control of . . . the minor child of
the parties hereto.”43 In 1967, the California Court of Appeal reversed, em-
phasizing that custodial judgments about children’s best interests were not a
matter of law but of fact.44 Lesbian mothers and gay fathers, in other words,
must have a chance to demonstrate their fitness as parents (p. 98).
38. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014); Borman v. Pyles-Borman,
No. 2014CV36, 2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014).
39. Compare DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding state bans on
same-sex marriage), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571), with
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014), Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 308 (2014), and sub nom. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014), Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014), and Bishop
v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (all striking down
state same-sex marriage bans or nonrecognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages).
40. DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388, cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-
571).
41. See McCarthy, supra note 33.
42. P. 98. Gash cites, for example, Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d
379, 380–82 (1952), in which the court denied even limited visitation to a divorced father
because of his “homosexual tendencies,” which would risk exposing “children in [his] cus-
tody . . . to improper conditions and undesirable influences.”
43. Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 354.
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For the next two decades or even longer, an important aspect of repre-
senting lesbians (especially) and gay men45 was trying to use the space that
Nadler and subsequent cases created to help those clients maintain custody
of their children. Gash argues that this posture “required the parenting
movement to adopt three approaches” (p. 99):
First, the very nature of these disputes—individual spousal disputes involv-
ing children, which were handled in family court on a case-by-case basis—
helped to keep even the victories off the public radar. . . .
Second, these early cases placed homosexuality on trial. Typically at
issue in these trials is the simple contention that either a gay or lesbian
parent cannot properly perform their parental duties because of their ho-
mosexuality, or that exposure to homosexuality would harm the child. . . .
To defend their clients . . . in many cases, advocates encouraged judges to
look beyond their client’s sexual orientation to see their skills and contri-
butions as a parent. . . . [A]dvocates focused on establishing the irrelevance
[of] a parent’s sexual orientation when determining questions of
custody. . . .
Third, and relatedly, the risks associated with these cases—that a par-
ent-child relationship could be legally severed—in some ways contained
and constrained legal advocates to use arguments that had previously been
made in other parenting arenas. . . . [A]dvocates attempted to base their
arguments on family law doctrines established in cases involving heterosex-
ual parents. In downplaying, for instance, the relevance of sexuality, advo-
cates relied on the more universal application of the “best interest of the
child” standard . . . . Cases concerning parents in interracial relation-
ships . . . provided precedent in some instances for courts to reject categor-
ical arguments of social opprobrium when resolving custody disputes, and
instead employ a case-by-case approach to determine the best interests of
the child. . . . In many ways, the structure of family law—its implicit case-
by-case philosophy, its focus on privileging children’s welfare above all
other interests, and the considerable discretion granted to family and other
lower court justices in considering how to determine the “best interests of
the child”—make it an ideal platform for expanding the rights of an un-
popular minority group without awakening an intense public
countermovement. (pp. 99–102)
The next phase of parenting advocacy began in the mid-1980s, as same-
sex people and couples sought to formalize their parenting arrangements
using single, joint, and second-parent46 adoptions (p. 102). This was, Gash
argues, “stealth” advocacy: adoptions “were legalized in intimate family
court settings with little attention beyond family and friends” (p. 102).
Sometimes even other judges didn’t know what was occurring. A same-sex
45. Parenting by LGBT persons has long been concentrated among women; even today,
women comprise 72 percent of the LGBT adults who are raising children. Gary J. Gates, LGBT
Parenting in the United States 4 (2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf (reporting results from the Gallup Daily Tracking Sur-
vey, June–September 2012).
46. Second-parent adoptions allow one member of a couple to adopt a child who is
already the legal son or daughter of the other member of the couple.
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parenting advocate and scholar told Gash that, in Vermont, “[m]any of the
family court judges in the state kept the decisions to themselves without
realizing that their colleagues were granting them as well. It was only during
an annual retreat that a few of them admitted to recognizing the adoptions”
(p. 102). Between 1985 and the early 2000s, Gash recounts, second-parent
adoptions were approved in many states—today, at least thirty states sup-
port same-sex parenting (p. 131), but it remains hard to tally “because these
cases occur largely outside of public view” and sometimes county by county
(p. 95).
The resulting backlash, Gash emphasizes, was minimal—but not for
lack of trying by opposition groups. Significant anti-LGBT-parenting efforts
took place between 2004 and 2006 in particular, but those efforts limited
parenting access in only a few states (pp. 92–94). As Gash summarizes,
“[d]espite dire predictions” about 2006, little changed:
Legislation died in committee. Proposed initiatives never made it to the
ballot. All the while family, appellate, and state supreme courts continued
to grant adoptions to and recognize the parental rights of gay and lesbian
parents. To be sure, aggressive campaigns were mounted, and some came
close to enactment. But few ultimately succeeded. (p. 92)
The public simply could not be roused against parenting equality in the way
that it was temporarily mobilized against marriage equality.
Gash attributes the absence of parenting-equality backlash in part to the
application to more recent parenting cases of “ ‘below-the-radar’ strategies”
(p. 97) honed in the custody dispute cases of the 1970s and described above.
The determined effort to avoid publicity, essential in divorce-related custo-
dial disputes, was equally helpful in other parenting contexts. The consistent
framing of sexual orientation as irrelevant to parenting likewise continued to
be much more attractive than rights-based arguments. Gash quotes a lawyer
from a high-profile gay rights organization: “There are many cases where we
don’t even put our name on the brief. We don’t want them to misapprehend
that this is a political issue—with the name of a major gay rights group on
the cover. It is solely the best interest of the child” (p. 120).
Advocates scrupulously avoided shiny constitutional claims in favor of
“very technical” appeals, using, for example, “statutory interpretation of
adoption laws and the history of their interpretation” (p. 114; internal quo-
tation marks omitted). In addition, Gash suggests, “[i]nitially, when adop-
tion advocates first started advancing rights for gay and lesbian parents—
and when gay rights groups took up the issue—the goal was to keep the
issue at the lower court level to reduce public attention” (p. 114).
In fact, although Gash does not comment on this point, she quotes one
lawyer explaining that advocates’ efforts were much more fine-grained than
simply trying to stay in trial courts.
I make huge efforts to keep it on the down low—I go and talk to the judge
who does adoptions, explain the theory, and see if the judge would be
comfortable. The one time the judge wouldn’t do that, he ruled against me
and we had to appeal it. I do that in counties where I am not familiar. . . .
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That makes a really big difference. You have to take steps to keep it under
the radar. I make sure to tell these judges that this is not a test case. We are
not going to put you on the spot. I appreciate that you are an elected judge
and I am not going to do something that will hurt you. (p. 117; internal
quotation marks omitted)
Gash fails to develop this insight, but it is an important one. It’s true
that uncontested adoptions are particularly suited to avoiding appellate re-
view—if the petitioning parent is approved to adopt, there’s nobody to ap-
peal. But efforts to stay below the radar are only part of the story; gay and
lesbian parents seeking to adopt have often picked not just the level of the
courts in which they appear but the actual judges they petition. Gash’s in-
formant explained that she aimed to “see if the judge would be comfortable”
(p. 117). Presumably, if the answer were no, at least sometimes the response
would be to avoid pressing the point, or simply try to find a different
judge—for example, by temporarily renting a house or apartment in a
county with LGBT-friendly judges in the relevant court.47
In any event, Gash emphasizes that the careful advocacy and its stealth
quality were not the product of unconsidered or individual decisionmaking:
“The decision to employ below-the-radar strategies when pursuing same-sex
parenting litigation was not the product of a few lone advocates operating in
isolation. Instead, advocates nationwide shared their strategies with each
other through word-of-mouth correspondence with scholars, advocates, and
judges” (p. 111). The National Center for Lesbian Rights “eventually” facili-
tated “more organized events and channels” (p. 111). This approach was
motivated by the “hope [of] incrementally develop[ing] positive precedent
without politicizing their efforts” (p. 111).
These efforts had been underway for many years before 2006, “when the
opposition . . . launched their full-scale attack against same-sex parenting”
(p. 111). And so by the time parenting-equality opponents really got started,
they had lost the facts on the ground: thousands upon thousands of children
were being raised in families ratified by thousands upon thousands of adop-
tions approved by hundreds of trial courts as serving the best interests of the
children in question.
Of course, this kind of low-visibility and individuated litigation has its
downsides. Consider what happened in Michigan—an incident Gash briefly
mentions.48 In 1993, Nancy Wheeler (then Nancy Francis), a Washtenaw
County trial judge, was presiding over the court where adoptions are rati-
fied. She began to grant second-parent adoptions to same-sex couples who
were foster parents.49 She explained years later:
47. Interview with adoptive lesbian parent from Georgia (Aug. 25, 2014) (describing
friends who pursued adoptions in Clarke County, Georgia, by means like these).
48. For documents and additional detail, see In the Matters of Unmarried Couple Adop-
tions, Civ. Rts. Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14052
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
49. Memorandum from Judge Nancy Francis to the Adoption Staff of Washtenaw Cnty.
Probate Ct. (Sept. 26, 1993), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-MI-
0007-0006.pdf.
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I thought that it was an outrage that we encouraged and, in fact, had a
lot of gay and lesbian foster parents, but didn’t allow both parties to adopt
the children. So, these children had been in foster care with these same
parents sometimes for a number of years and then they were adopted by
one.50
Judge Wheeler decided that, as paraphrased by a reporter, “if one person
could be an adoptive parent, then two could.”51 When Judge Donald Shelton
succeeded her, he continued to approve second-parent adoptions.52 In 2002,
however, Chief Justice Maura Corrigan of the Michigan Supreme Court de-
cided to put a stop to second-parent adoptions by unmarried couples. She
contacted the chief judge of Washtenaw’s county court and directed him to
end the practice.53 Judge Archie Brown complied, issuing a memo declaring,
“Effective immediately the Washtenaw County Trial Court and in particular,
the Juvenile Division staff, shall no longer process petitions for second par-
ent adoptions, including any petitions that are currently pending.”54 Judge
Brown cited a “legal opinion from an adoption specialist” interpreting the
Michigan adoption statute.55 Judge Shelton, however, pushed back, taking
the position that his chief judge lacked the authority to dictate on a matter
of law.56 At this point, Judge Brown took advantage of his procedural powers
as chief judge and reassigned all the pending cases to himself.57 Second-
parent adoptions were dead in Washtenaw County. Two years later, Michi-
gan Attorney General Mike Cox issued an opinion stating that the statute
50. Lester Graham, How Judges Were Stopped from Granting Two-Parent Adoptions to Gay




52. See Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Disqualify Judge at 4, In re Adoption
Cases (Washtenaw Cnty. Trial Ct. Fam. Div. July 31, 2002), available at http://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/PB-MI-0007-0003.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Memorandum from Judge Archie C. Brown to Juvenile Div. Staff (June 4, 2002)
[hereinafter Brown Memo], available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-MI-
0007-0004.pdf.
55. Id. MCL § 710.24(1) provides in pertinent part: “[I]f a person desires to adopt a
child . . . that person, together with his wife or her husband, if married, shall file a petition.”
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.24(1) (2012 & Supp. 2014). Judge Brown opined that “[t]he
language of the statute, under any reasonable construction, cannot refer to two or more indi-
viduals unless they are married to one another.” Brown Memo, supra note 54.
56. Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Disqualify Judge, supra note 52, at 6.
57. Reassignment Order, In re Unmarried Couple Adoptions (Washtenaw Cnty. Trial Ct.
Fam. Div. June 20, 2002), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/PB-
MI-0007-0001.pdf; see also In re [ ], a minor, No. 02-143-AO/02-0144-RB (Washtenaw Cnty.
Trial Ct. Fam. Div. June 21, 2002), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PB-MI-0007-0005.pdf.
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disallowed joint adoption by unmarried couples.58 Such adoptions appar-
ently continued in at least one other location,59 but the Washtenaw episode
at least greatly reduced their number in Michigan and perhaps all but shut
them down—even though the antiadoption statutory argument is far from
ironclad60 and similar statutory language has been read in other states to
allow unmarried same-sex couples to jointly adopt children.61 No appeals
were pursued in the Washtenaw cases because that would have only solidi-
fied the precedent given the expected outcome in the Michigan Supreme
Court.62
Gash explains that below-the-radar gains can be easily undermined by
“lapses in legal judgment” (p. 197). And while she omits to mention it, it’s
obvious that less stealthy interventions often benefit from ordinary procedu-
ral protections unavailable to below-the-radar litigation so reliant on indi-
viduated judicial discretion. For this and other reasons, it’s clear that
parenting-equality advocacy did not achieve unmitigated progress.63 But
much of the theorizing about social-change litigation suggests that, in forgo-
ing the opportunity to use litigation as an organizing tool, lawyers give up
58. Validity of Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriages in Michigan, Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
7160 (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/2000s/op10236
.htm, and at 2004 WL 2096457, at *3. The opinion was chiefly about the validity in Michigan
of same-sex marriages celebrated in Massachusetts. But it included a bare two sentences on the
adoption issue:
The Michigan Adoption Code, 1998 PA 474, MCL 710.21 et seq, provides in section 24
that adoption shall be by a person or a married couple. The Michigan Court of Appeals
confirmed that “it has been held inconsistent with the general scope and purpose of
adoption statutes to allow two unmarried persons to make a joint adoption.” In re Ad-
ams, 473 N.W.2d 712, 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. In fact, In re Adams dealt with a very different question: whether two persons each married
to someone else could jointly adopt a child. 473 N.W.2d 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
59. See Usitalo v. Landon, 829 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (describing one such
adoption allowed in Shiawassee County in 2005 and declining to undo it).
60. My view is that Judge Brown’s reading of the statute is not the best one: the text as
written seems designed not to express by negative inference that unmarried couples cannot
jointly adopt children but rather to make spouses necessary parties to adoption petitions,
thereby avoiding situations in which one spouse adopts a child against the other spouse’s
desires.
61. See, for example, Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 903 (2009 & Supp. 2012), which states
that “[a]n unmarried person or a husband and wife jointly, who are not legally separated or
who are not living apart from each other, or a divorced or legally separated person,” may
petition to adopt, and In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1185 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001), which held that
“the term ‘unmarried person’ though stated in the singular can be read to include the plural
‘unmarried persons.’” See also William C. Duncan, In Whose Best Interests: Sexual Orientation
and Adoption Law, 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 787, 801–02 (2003) (describing and challenging several
courts’ similar decisions).
62. Telephone Interview with Jay Kaplan, Staff Attorney for the LGBT Project, ACLU of
Mich. (Sept. 2, 2014).
63. See pp. 94-96 (describing setbacks for parenting equality in Alabama, Kansas, and
North Carolina).
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on the very modality by which litigation can actually accomplish something.
The parenting-equality study falsifies this hypothesis.
In fact, not only have the below-the-radar (and forum-shopping) strate-
gies worked, to a very large extent, for parenting equality—but this parent-
ing-equality progress is in turn proving vitally important to marriage-
equality advocacy. With moral or religious disapproval of LGBT persons or
same-sex sex ruled out as a justification,64 opponents of same-sex marriage
have struggled to articulate the appropriate governmental purpose on which
same-sex marriage bans must be founded in order to satisfy constitutional
scrutiny. Arguments based on children’s welfare were the best options avail-
able. For example, in Windsor, the party’s brief filed in opposition to same-
sex marriage offers three state interests purportedly justifying state choices
“either to expand the traditional definition [of marriage] to include same-
sex couples or retain the traditional definition.”65 All three focused on the
best interests of children: (1) “Providing a Stable Structure to Raise Unin-
tended and Unplanned Offspring”; (2) “Encouraging the Rearing of Chil-
dren by Their Biological Parents”; and (3) “Promoting Childrearing by Both
a Mother and a Father.”66
Each of these arguments is premised on two empirical claims: that bar-
ring same-sex marriage leads to children being raised by different-sex
couples, and that different-sex couples are better parents. Progress in the
parenting-equality project—including decades of judicial best-interest and
parental-fitness findings—suggests that both are factually implausible. Gash
puts it this way:
Lower court rulings, then, established critical data points. The existence of
a growing population of LGBT-headed families, legitimized by courts, di-
rectly challenged anti-marriage and parenting campaigns that characterized
same-sex couples as either unlikely or unacceptable parents. The increasing
prevalence of gay couples raising kids also elevated advocate appeals about
the welfare costs and rights impingements for children if LGBT parenting
or marriage opponents prevailed. (p. 34)
The existence of a growing population of LGBT-headed families, legiti-
mized by courts, directly challenged anti-marriage and parenting campaigns
64. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics:
How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L.
Rev. 275, 321–22 (2013) (“The unmistakable message of Romer was that TFV [traditional
family values] zealots who insisted on demonizing gay people ran the risk that judges would
strike down their proposals based on Romer’s rejection of anti-gay ‘animus’ as a defensible
basis for modern legislation or, as in Romer, voter initiatives. The politics of disgust, at least as
applied to LGBT people, was thus rendered unconstitutional.”).
65. Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S.
House of Representatives at 43, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-NY-0017-0015.pdf.
66. Id. at 44, 47–48 (emphasis omitted).
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that characterized same-sex couples as either unlikely or unacceptable par-
ents. The increasing prevalence of gay couples raising kids also elevated ad-
vocate appeals about the welfare costs and rights impingements for children
if LGBT parenting or marriage opponents prevailed.
In addition, parenting-equality progress has increased both the number
and salience of a far less hypothetical group of children—those already being
raised by same-sex couples. Consider the language Justice Kennedy used in
his opinion for the Court in United States v. Windsor striking down DOMA:
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages and make them unequal. . . . The differentiation demeans the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects, and
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in
question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other fam-
ilies in their community and in their daily lives.67
Over decades, parenting-equality efforts have rendered implausible the
children’s welfare arguments offered in service of same-sex marriage bans,
and prioritized much more logical proequality welfare arguments. As Gash
puts it, “Low-visibility gains for gay and lesbian parents . . . were used to
leverage marriage equality victories” (p. 48).
II. Group Homes and the Fight for Neighborhood Access
The second story Gash tells is about group-home siting. She examines
the siting practices of many of the organizations that run small congregate
homes for people with developmental disabilities or mental illness, for re-
covering addicts, and so on. Some organizations, Gash finds, attempt a “col-
laborative” approach with their prospective neighbors:
Collaborative organizations work closely with city officials and community
residents to make sure that all stakeholders involved in the siting decision
are comfortable. These organizations go out of their way to notify neigh-
bors of their intention to locate in their neighborhood. Collaborative orga-
nizations will also work closely with zoning officials prior to purchasing or
renting the property to secure all permits, variances, and exemptions. Col-
laborative organizations employ a variety of tactics to gain the support of
community residents, ranging from informal meetings with community
members to gather feedback and provide information, to more official
public hearings. (p. 174; footnote omitted)
On the opposite end of the spectrum are “stealth” organizations:
Stealth organizations will purchase or rent their properties before con-
tacting neighbors and zoning officials. . . . [S]ome stealth operators are
willing to apply for variances if required, but will only do so after securing
the property. Some operators simply skirt the zoning process altogether,
67. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (citation omitted).
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arguing that the requirements are discriminatory. If forced to apply for
zoning, these operators head straight to court. (p. 176)
The “stealth” playbook was pioneered by Oxford House, a network of
“self run, self supported addiction recovery houses,”68 which has explicitly
explained its own policy: “As a matter of practice, Oxford House does not
seek prior approval of zoning regulations before moving into a residential
neighborhood. It considers itself no different from a biological family and its
members just move into any suitable house.”69 The organization’s lawyer
elaborated in a court hearing:
[P]ublic hearings before zoning boards has [sic] a very deleterious and det-
rimental effect upon the recovery of the residents. It’s been our experience
that neighbors who object to the presence of a group of unrelated recover-
ing addicts and alcoholics come and forcibly object their—voice their ob-
jections to this. The residents are then singled out for I think what would
be unfair public scrutiny. Many times if they are required to testify they
must identify themselves. . . . And it has been our experience that when
having to apply for a special use permit it creates a great deal of uncer-
tainty and anxiety about what the future of their home will be, and the
relapse rate increases as a result of those . . . .70
What Gash calls “cooperative” operators fall somewhere in between.
Gash sees the stealth approach as a below-the-radar strategy like the
parenting-equality tactics she describes in earlier chapters. In the group-
home setting, the goal is to minimize and manage NIMBY-type opposition
to particular group homes, depriving opponents of tactics like attempting to
dissuade house sellers. And, as in the parenting-equality setting, the ap-
proach has been quite successful. Gash reports several studies indicating that
stealth operators, who notify neighborhoods only after they open a home,
encounter much less opposition to their homes than organizations that no-
tify neighborhoods in advance (p. 181–82). To that research base Gash adds
her own study, which relies on newspaper accounts of group-home siting
attempts. Her data convincingly demonstrate that stealth operators are far
more successful at opening homes71:
68. Oxford House, http://www.oxfordhouse.org/userfiles/file/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2014).
69. United States v. Vill. of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Oxford
House, Inc.’s stated policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. P. 181 (quoting United States v. Vill. of Palatine, No. 93-C-2154, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13814, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1993)).
71. This information is adapted from Table 6.2 in Below the Radar (p. 183).
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Table 1
Sitting Success Rate by Group-Home
Disclosure Strategy




Total         277 70%
III. Theories of Lawyering for Minority Rights
As I pointed out in the Introduction, a generation of scholarship has
counseled lawyers seeking to bring about social change to use litigation as a
mobilizing and organizing tool. Many lawyers themselves have grown to un-
derstand that courtroom victories are more likely to serve the values they
proclaim if those victories are used to promote high-visibility politics. In-
deed, as Gash explains:
Visibility has come to define our understanding of modern civil rights
battles. . . . Through images, narratives, and protests the “haves” can be
shaken from a stupor of complacency and become so moved by these in-
justices that they are willing to give up their privileged status and be cata-
lyzed into action. . . .
. . . In the absence of vivid photographs and video footage of white
police officers using billy clubs, fire hoses, and attack dogs against young
student protesters, Jim Crow would have likely persisted. (p. 187)
Gash’s theoretical contribution—and it is a significant one—is to add
low-visibility tactics to this literature of the politics of rights. Her basic claim
is compelling: “By omitting instances of low-visibility advocacy from studies
of civil rights, we both underestimate how activists control public awareness
in order to advance civil rights claims and overemphasize the potential for
public opposition to hinder these goals” (p. 192).
The case studies on parenting equality and group-home siting demon-
strate both that “below-the-radar strategies are a fixture of civil rights legal
advocacy” and that they can be very effective (p. 197). Gash is persuasive, as
well, in arguing that what she calls “institutional pluralism” is a key feature
of the environment, and one that has received insufficient attention in the
scholarship (p. 205):
The decision to litigate, for instance, is typically reached within an environ-
ment marked by institutional diversity. Rarely does one venue offer the
exclusive and final word on a particular policy position. Advocates develop
their legal strategies knowing full well that legal action will likely prompt a
legislative, regulatory, or popular response. Likewise, from a bird’s eye
view, low-visibility and high-profile advocacy strategies combine—doctri-
nally, temporally, geographically, or institutionally—to produce a range of
policy possibilities. Advocates may be able to pursue low-profile strategies
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and achieve meaningful gains because of public preoccupation with other
policy debates. And high-profile wins may be scored on the shoulders of
hidden, but no less significant, advocate battles. (pp. 205)
The many lawyers Gash describes in her case studies have a thicker playbook
than the theorists who have studied their work report.
And yet even while Gash expands and complexifies the theoretical
framework she has inherited, there remains a crucial gap in her account—a
failure to deal with one key feature both of her case studies share. For both
parenting-equality and group-home advocacy, a key strategy was to change
the status quo before offering justifications. This approach is common
enough to summon up a number of clichés: lawyers (and many others) talk
about faits accomplis, facts on the ground, possession being nine-tenths of
the law, seeking forgiveness rather than permission, and so on. The underly-
ing point is the same: both factually and legally, it’s easier to defend than to
attack. As a result, parties about to enter a conflict work hard to lay claim to
the status quo—the defensive position.
This insight applies in a variety of settings—and it can lead to some
counterintuitive results. Consider, for example, Professor Hochschild’s study
of three decades of school desegregation decrees. Hochschild finds that in-
cremental and participatory desegregation methods tend to fail, first by scar-
ing white families into finding alternatives to desegregated schools and then
by giving them time to put those alternatives in place.72 Rapid and extensive
desegregation orders, by contrast, changed the facts on the ground, increas-
ing the cost, in money and disruption, of white flight to white families and
demonstrating at least to some of those families that the new status quo was
more attractive than they had feared.73 Accordingly, less incremental decrees
substantially outperformed more incremental ones, in terms of actually inte-
grating public schools.74
The “facts-on-the-ground” insight sheds additional light on both of
Gash’s case studies. Changing the facts on the ground obviously describes
the basic approach of the “stealth” group-home operators; one of them even
told Gash that “it is much better to ask for forgiveness than to beg for per-
mission” (p. 166). Buying property on the quiet is a time-honored way to
improve one’s bargaining position as to that property’s use. And by moving
in, group-home residents become real neighbors, potentially far less threat-
ening than hypothetical people with disabilities, addictions, or similar issues.
In other words, it may be possession, not stealth, that decreased backlash for
these homes.
In the parenting-equality case study, the facts-on-the-ground point ap-
pears similarly vital. First, one contributor to LGBT successes seems to have
been that those seeking parental rights were already acting as parents,
72. Jennifer L. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy
and School Desegregation 46–91 (1984).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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whether as parents of their own biological children seeking to avoid custo-
dial loss or as de facto parents of their foster children or their partners’
children.75 Second, Gash tells us that advocates worked hard to stay out of
appellate courts because such courts are higher profile than district courts
(p. 49). There are, however, other reasons to avoid appellate courts. Com-
pared to trial courts—and especially compared to trial courts where litigants
have some ability to pick their judges, as in the courts that hear adoption
matters—appellate courts are not just more conspicuous. They are also
more dangerous and less predictable. Appellate judges are chosen from a
broader pool, with judge-selection practices far less susceptible to odds-en-
hancing techniques. Accordingly, Gash’s informants found it prudent to risk
appellate review only after the accumulation of proadoption trial court prac-
tice—and only after thousands of children were being raised by court-ap-
proved gay and lesbian adoptive parents (p. 114–15). Gash explains that in
Vermont, for example, the state supreme court addressed second-parent
adoption only “because one probate court judge strategically refused to
grant an adoption petition filed by a lesbian couple in order to encourage its
review (and its validation) by the state’s highest court. The judge felt the
timing was right.”76
Similarly, Gash quotes one attorney in California who recounted the
movement’s approach as working “to keep it quiet and get as many granted
at the trial level before getting an appellate decision. In California, this was
twenty years after gays had been adopting. Approximately 20,000 kids would
be impacted” (p. 115; internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, another way
of characterizing Gash’s evidence on appeal-avoidance would be to empha-
size not the potential for backlash if the public found out what was going on
but advocates’ efforts to gain a status-quo advantage before risking their
cause in front of a judicial audience that might well be less friendly.
A final way in which the facts-on-the-ground lens sharpens the parent-
ing-equality case study is that, as Gash explains but does not really theorize,
the parenting-equality victories changed facts that proved crucial in decision
of the marriage-equality cases. These parenting-equality victories demon-
strated the parental fitness of same-sex couples and increased the number
and salience of children raised by such couples.
For all its keen insights, Below the Radar would have been enriched by
some analysis of the interaction between stealth tactics and facts-on-the-
ground tactics. For example, are stealth tactics useful only when they can
contribute to a fait accompli? And how are they different from other similar
efforts to gain a status-quo advantage, such as the very public decrees that
Hochschild champions? And so on. This point should not detract from the
75. See p. 103.
76. P. 115. The case in question must have been In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B.,
628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
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book’s real achievement, however. Below the Radar tells two important, in-
teresting, and little-known stories, and it uses those stories to make an im-
portant theoretical contribution to a major scholarly debate. Gash brings
stealth out into the open.
